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Abstract: Semanticists often assume an ontology for natural language that includes not only ordinary
objects, but also events, and other sorts of entities. We link this ontology to how speakers represent
static and dynamic entities. Specifically, we test how speakers determine whether an entity counts as
“atomic” by using count vs. mass (e.g., some gleebs, some gleeb) and distributive vs. non-distributive
descriptions (e.g., gleeb every second or so, gleeb around a little). We then seek evidence for atomic
representation in a non-linguistic task. Ultimately we suggest that natural language ontology reveals
properties of language-independent conceptualization.
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1. Introduction
Many semanticists now assume an ontology for natural language that in-
cludes not only ordinary objects like cups and tables, but also events like
jumpings and fallings (e.g., Vendler 1957; Davidson 1967). A noun like
cup applies to the object type, while a verb like jump applies to the event
type. At the same time, developmental and cognitive psychologists have
become increasingly more interested in understanding how dynamic enti-
ties are represented, and philosophers have debated whether events form
a distinct metaphysical category, and, if so, with what properties (Zacks
& Tversky 2001 and Casati & Varzi. 2008, respectively, provide recent
overviews). This paper contributes an attempt to link the semanticists’
notion of an event to the psychologists’ notion. We do this by investigating
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the conditions under which people carve up their experience into static or
dynamic categories with different formal properties.
In fact, the linguistic ontology is often thought to be populated not
only by objects and events, but by other categories of spatial and tempo-
ral entity including at least substances and processes (Vendler 1957; see
Champollion & Krifka 2016). The sheer variety of types of entities as-
sumed can quickly lead to conflicts, though, between what language seems
to commit its speakers to, and what an austere metaphysics might prefer
(Pietroski 2015). Consider the case of a solid gold ring, which can be fe-
licitously referred to in a context either as the gold or the ring. Intuition
suggests that the ring and the gold are the same thing; meanwhile, we can
truthfully ascribe properties to the ring (e.g., being ornate) that are not
true of the gold (Link 1983). The same can be observed for happenings:
suppose that we intuit that whatever Ann did, it satisfies both her crossing
the Channel and her swimming – the trouble is, we may want to say that
while the crossing was fast, her swimming was slow (cf. Davidson 1985;
Krifka 1989).
Making these ontological distinctions matters for a semantic theory
that aims to specify the connections between what words and sentences
mean, and the things that they truthfully apply to. Yet, as we have hinted,
positing such distinctions in the ontology is also puzzling, if the relevant
things have to be “out there” in the world. The standard interpretation of
the enterprise allows the study of natural language to be a useful probe
for reasoning about metaphysics; if so, semanticists will have to actively
commit themselves to a world with very different properties than might be
suggested by other branches of science. As the number of types of entities
in the model multiply, and if two or more of those entities have to occupy
the same region of space–time, it becomes more and more difficult to see
how a mind-independent world putatively consisting of atoms, quarks, and
strings or whatever can support the requisite metaphysics.
On the other hand, generative linguists going back at least to Chomsky
(1965) have demanded that a theory of meaning relate linguistic expres-
sions not to the world, but to non-linguistic cognition. In light of its pre-
sumed metaphysical commitments, the project of the formal semanticist is
thus distinct from the goals of generative linguistics. This difference in the
stated explanatory domain has led some linguists to claim that a semantic
theory is not properly a part of linguistic theory at all (see Chomsky 1995;
cf. Partee 1979). Meanwhile, formal semantics has continued to accrue
many descriptive successes, and the question of its foundations has for the
most part languished. In recent years, though, there has been an upsurge
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in new attempts to “naturalize” semantics, and thus align its agenda more
closely with that of generative syntax (e.g., Pietroski et al. 2009; Pietroski
2010; Lidz et al. 2011; Vogel et al. 2014). These views characterize formal
semantic description as a source of explicit hypotheses about how syntac-
tic representations align with representations in non-linguistic cognition.
This theoretical tension has led some thinkers to suppose that it is not
in the purview of semantic theory to negotiate between these two opposing
positions. Bach (1986b) takes an agnostic stance for what he calls “natural
language metaphysics” (see also Pelletier 2011; Bach & Chao 2012). On this
view, the semanticist need not, and in fact should not, commit to saying
more than: the entities we posit are those that speakers talk “as if” there
are (cf. Montague 1973, n. 8). Despite the presumed connection between
meaning and truth in natural language semantics, and the goal of that
theory to illuminate the nature of linguistic meaning, the explanatory goals
of semantics on Bach’s conception nevertheless exclude saying whether the
entities it posits are really “out there”, in some sense, or whether they are
actually indicative of deeper cognitive facts about speakers.
This paper aims to get beyond “talk as if ”. We examine how, within a
certain domain, semantic theory can be used to generate specific hypothe-
ses about how speakers represent and reason about the world. The case
we consider is Bach’s (1986a) analogy between objects and substances, on
the one hand, and events and processes on the other. We build on the
results of Wellwood et al. (2018), who found evidence for these categories
in conceptual categorization as a function of the “naturalness” of novel
spatial and temporal entities. There, we measured speakers’ preference for
describing these novel displays using count versus mass syntax (e.g., some
gleeb(ing) vs. some gleebs), and found that the locations – rather than, say,
the number – of boundaries in both the static images and the animations
were highly predictive of speakers’ preferences. In light of the semantic re-
quirements of count syntax, we interpreted this result as evidence for for-
mal parallels between object and event representation outside of language.
That work leaves two important questions open, and which our ex-
periments are designed to investigate: (i) whether the observed parallel
preferences between the spatial and temporal domains were due to object
and event individuation per se, as opposed to something specifically lim-
ited to speakers’ understanding of the semantics of nominal plurality; and
(ii) whether this type of individuation exists independent of the pressures of
a forced-choice linguistic task. In §2, we first discuss the linguistic evidence
for the relevant ontological distinctions, their formal characterization, and
previous research informing our questions. In §3, we test the hypothesis
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that distributive adverbials involve the same sort of event individuation as
pluralized deverbal nouns (e.g., do some gleebs), as expected by Rothstein’s
(1995) analysis. In §4, we test the hypothesis that these preference tasks
reveal how people conceptualize static and dynamic entities independent
of language.
2. Conceptualizing the ontology
We use language to talk about all sorts of things, and many of the dif-
ferences between those things do not play any particularly important role
in linguistic description. For instance, no grammatical rules are sensitive
to the fact that cows are a distinct kind of animal from horses, and the
count nouns cow and horse share the same grammatical distribution – they
can be pluralized (cows, horses), modified by numerals (three cows, sev-
enteen horses), distributively quantified (each cow, every horse), etc. But
some of the properties of the things we talk about plausibly do relate to
important linguistic distinctions: mass nouns that name substances (e.g.,
flesh, steel) distribute differently from nouns that name objects. That is, it
is difficult to predict or locate the meaning of many pluralized substance-
denoting nouns (?fleshes, ?steels), to say how they should be counted (?three
flesh/es, ?seventeen steel/s), or to quantify them distributively (?each flesh,
?each steel), etc.1
In what follows, we first review the linguistic evidence for an ontology
that distinguishes, as the above examples suggest, objects from substances,
as well as events from processes. The primary theoretical distinction that
we target is the notion that expressions that apply to objects and events
refer atomically, while those that apply to substances and processes refer
non-atomically. Next, we show how the semantic analysis of the relevant
morphosyntactic cues (e.g., the plural morpheme, distributive adverbials,
etc.) bundles in the atomicity requirement. Finally, we combine the seman-
ticists’ notion of ‘Atom’ with recent results from cognitive psychology. This
allows us to generate hypotheses about how participants’ inferences about
certain features of static and dynamic entities should interact with those
linguistic features, and we put these hypotheses to the test in §3 and §4.
1 See Gillon (1992; 2012) and Chierchia (1998) for extensive discussion of the gram-
matical mass/count distinction in English and other languages.
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2.1. A précis of the linguistic evidence
Formal semanticists have distinguished objects and substances from events
and processes, based on how different expressions interact with linguistic
individuation, counting, and distributive quantification. Beginning with
expressions that are thought to apply to objects (cocktail) and events
(party), the obvious difference is that objects exist while events happen – a
difference borne out in asymmetries in the naturalness of predications in-
voking weights or start times, (1) (cf. Casati & Varzi. 2008).
a.(1) The cocktail weighed a pound.
b. ?The cocktail started at midnight.
a.(2) ?The party weighed a ton.
b. The party started at midnight.
Apart from this, there are a number of similarities. Objects and events are
the kinds of things that can be paired one to one, as the intuitive under-
standings of the constructions in (3) illustrate (cf. Boolos 1981; Rothstein
1995). For (3a) to be judged true, it must be the case that each individual
cocktail is paired with an individual shot in the relevant context. Similarly,
(3b) requires that each drinking event is paired with a getting ornery event.
a.(3) For every cocktail you drink, you get a free shot.
b. Every time you drink, you get ornery.
Expressions that apply to objects and events can comfortably be plural-
ized, either using the nominal plural morpheme, or by adverbials indicating
frequentative action (see Henderson 2013 and references therein for discus-
sion over devices available in other languages). The sentences in (4) imply
that Ann likes or drinks the things of the specified sort but not, for exam-
ple, some arbitrary quantity of the stuff of which they’re composed. In the
same way, the sentences in (5) imply that Ann likes or attended events
of the specified sort, not merely some arbitrary quantity of the activities
that go on during them.
a.(4) Ann likes cocktails.
b. Ann drinks shots.
a.(5) Ann likes parties.
b. Ann went partying again and again.
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Because object- and event-denoting expressions label individuated things,
these expressions can be modified by numerals in the nominal domain, (6),
as well as in the verbal domain, (7).
(6) Ann had three cocktails.
a.(7) Ann went to three parties.
b. Ann went partying three times last week.
The contrasting categories – substance and process – are disanalogous from
each other in exactly the same way as objects and events, and analogous
in ways exactly opposite to these categories. Substances (goo) are physical
entities, and so it makes sense to say how much they weigh, (8a), but it
is not easily said when they ‘start’, (8b). Processes (fun) are temporal
entities, and so cannot be weighed, (9a), but it is easy say when they
begin, (9b).
a.(8) The goo weighed a pound.
b. ?The goo started at midnight.
a.(9) ?The fun weighed a ton.
b. The fun started at midnight.
Substances and processes do not present themselves as obviously individu-
ated. This claim helps to explain why expressions that apply to these cat-
egories resist composition with constructions implying one-to-one pairing,
(10), or a plurality of individuated entities, (11)–(12). If such expressions
do not necessarily refer to individuated entities, this also helps account for
why it is not intuitively obvious what it would mean to say they occur in
a certain number, (13)–(14).
a.(10) ?For every goo you eat, you get water.
b. ?Every time you see, you breathe.
a.(11) ?Ann likes goos.
b. ?Ann drank gins.
a.(12) ?Ann likes funs.
b. ?Ann saw again and again.
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(13) Ann bought three goo(s).
a.(14) ?Ann had three fun(s).
b. ?Ann saw three times.
So far, we have just revisited common observations about the intuitive
differences that certain nouns and verbs have with respect to individuation,
and the concomitant effects on how we can use these expressions to talk
about or to quantify entities. Mereological semantic approaches capture
these effects as interactions between the domains of application for the
respective lexical items, and the semantic commitments imposed by the
morphosyntactic context.
2.2. Formalizing the analogy
A pluralized noun phrase, in almost all cases, carries the commitment that
its satisfiers are non-overlapping, countable things.2 In simple cases, like
with toys and spaceships, those satisfiers are things which do not have
arbitrary proper subparts in the privileged sense (i.e., in the sense of “un-
structured parthood” assumed in formal semantics; see Champollion 2017).
Another way of putting it is that they do not have parts that are the same
type as the whole. One way of guaranteeing this commitment is to say
that plural morphology on an NP presupposes that its NP denotes a set
of atoms. Atomicity can be defined for entities simpliciter if (15) holds, or
it can be defined relative to predicates or concepts as in (16) (cf. Krifka
1989; Grimm 2012; Rips & Hespos 2015 call this property “stratification”).
(15) Atom(x) = :9y(y < x)
‘x is an atom just in case x has no proper parts’
(16) Atomic(P ) = 8x(P (x) ! :9y(y < x ^ P (y)))
‘P is atomic just in case every x which is P has no y-parts that are also P.’
An expression that applies atomically thus provides just the sort of condi-
tion required for counting to be consistent in the first place (see Koslicki’s
1997 discussion of Frege’s criteria): the sorts of things they apply to are
2 Exceptions include so-called mass plurals like suds and mashed potatoes, for speakers
who accept these expressions in contexts like, “How much mashed potatoes do you
want?”. See Ojeda (2005) and Acquaviva (2008) for discussion. For exceptions to the
non-overlap requirement, see Rothstein (2010).
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not such that you can just keep dividing them and still find numerically
further instances of the same thing.3,4
In Link’s (1983) model (and that of many others since), plural mor-
phology merely introduces the algebraic closure of a set, notated *. Sup-
posing that the denotation of a count noun like toy is fa; b; cg, where each
of a, b, and c meet the condition in (16), then *toy would denote the set
fa; b; c; a  b; a  c; b  c; a  b  cg, including the atoms as well as
all of the possible sums consisting of just those atoms. The denotation
of a mass noun like flesh is also a set, but which need not have minimal
parts (i.e., it is anti-atomic; see Gillon 2012 for recent discussion of differ-
ent approaches to the semantics of mass nouns).5 If the plural morpheme
requires that its N denote atomic objects, this can help explain why it is
that languages exist in which such nouns must first be ‘singularized’ before
they can be pluralized (Mathieu 2012; cf. Borer 2005). Wellwood (2014)
interprets this as effecting a mapping from a non-atomic (or anti-atomic)
domain to an atomic one, allowing a substance-denoting noun to meet the
atomicity condition of the plural morpheme.
Of interest to us is not whether known lexical items satisfy an atom-
icity condition, but whether people’s comprehension of their world is such
that it traffics in such notions like ‘atomicity’ as it is defined in semantics.
If so, we would expect participants to understand a novel noun (or verb)
in just these terms, and in the same way, if the novel item is embedded in
any linguistic context that requires atomicity. Such a finding would sug-
3 The notion of ‘dividing’ is not without difficulties; see especially Zucchi & White
(2001). Rothstein (2010) among others advocate for a contextual parameter that
fixes what counts as an atom in a context.
4 We understand ‘countability’ in this sense to apply to the extralinguistic entities
which a given expression may or may not apply to. This notion of countability is
thus independent from that employed when talking about, for example, the distri-
butional properties of predicates, wherein a predicate may be called ‘countable’ if it
combines directly with cardinal number words, etc. See Rothstein (2017) for discus-
sion of countability in the latter sense.
5 An alternative explanation to that implied in the text for the fact that characteris-
tically mass nouns do not easily pluralize relates to the hypothesis that substance
domains are natively closed under sum formation. Applying a closure-under-sum op-
eration would thus be redundant (Champollion & Krifka 2016). This explanation
appears to miss the fact that, when a substance-denoting phrase is pluralized, its
interpretation is akin to that of a plural object-denoting noun; fleshes implies that
there is a plurality of countable things, each of which is constituted by some flesh. It
does not mean what flesh means.
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gest the potential for semantic theory to inform how people represent and
reason about the world.
What sorts of other linguistic contexts have been suggested to involve
the atomicity property? Many authors have suggested that the verbal par-
allel of the mass/count distinction in the nominal domain is the atelic/telic
distinction (e.g., Mourelatos 1978; Hoepelman & Rohrer 1980), which de-
scribes how grammar interacts with different categories of eventuality.
The intuition is that telic predicates – which include information about
when an eventuality is ‘completed’ – express properties of entities that are
bounded in time in much the same way that count nouns express proper-
ties of entities bounded in space, while atelic predicates express properties
of activities or processes. On Bach’s (1986b) formalization, paralleling that
offered by Link (1983) for objects and substances, telic VPs express prop-
erties of atomic events, whereas atelic VPs apply to non-atomic processes
(though compare Rothstein 2004).
Of particular interest to us is the fact that we can identify linguistic
contexts that insist that their VP be atomic, understood in a precise way
as the eventive equivalent of (15)–(16). Rothstein (1995) presents just such
a case: that of distributive adverbials like every time he walked into the
room, she turned to stare. Distributive adverbials like this express that a
one-to-one mapping holds between the event described in the adverbial,
and that expressed by the embedded sentence. In light of analyses like
these, the sentence in (17a) should impose parallel commitments on the
novel verb gleeb as the sentence in (17b) imposes on the novel noun.
a.(17) The star gleebed every second or so.
b. There are some gleebs.
2.3. Previous experimental results
Objects and events that are easy to individuate invite the use of count
syntax and counting, even when these items are unfamiliar. For example,
Prasada et al. (2002) found that people chose a novel noun in count syn-
tax (There’s a blicket in the tray) over mass syntax (There’s blicket in
the tray) to describe unfamiliar cut-out shapes when the shapes appeared
non-arbitrary. In that experiment, the degree of nonarbitrariness varied as
a function of the shape’s repetition, regularity, or shape-relevant use.
Likewise, events that take place within a short time-span – punctual
events, such as clapping or jumping – encourage comparison by number
of occurrences over comparison along other dimensions, such as total
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duration. Barner et al. (2008) asked participants to decided who “did more
Ns?” or who “did more N -ing?” for nouns derived from either durative
verbs (e.g., dance, run) or punctual verbs (e.g., jump, kick). The partic-
ipants’ choice was between a character who did more repetitions (e.g., a
larger number of dances or jumps) or a character whose action had a larger
quantity of some other relevant dimension (usually duration, distance, or
intensity). Barner et al. found that, for punctual verbs, number of repeti-
tions dominated the alternative dimension in both syntactic contexts. For
example, participants chose the character who did more jumps in answer
to both “Who did more jumps?” and “Who did more jumping?” But for
durative verbs, repetition mattered for count syntax but the alternative
dimension mattered for mass syntax. For “Who did more dances?” number
of repetitions mattered most, but for “Who did more dancing?” duration
mattered most.
Figure 1: Samples of naturally-divided images with 4 and 5 breaks (left) and un-
naturally-divided images with 4 and 5 breaks (right)
We can interpret these results as suggesting that perceived atomicity of
an entity influences whether we can use count syntax to describe it, and
whether counting is an appropriate dimension of comparison. For example,
the regularity of a shape implies that the shape has a unity and discreteness
that allows it to be counted, and similarly for the punctuality of an event.
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This commonality between the domains of objects and events is in line
with the analogy that we sketched in §2.1 and §2.2.
To obtain more direct evidence for this correspondence, we asked par-
ticipants in an earlier study (Wellwood et al. 2018) to decide between
count or mass descriptions of matched images and animations. In the im-
age condition, participants saw images with parts of equivalent size and
shape at natural points (i.e., several “petals” of the same size) or images
with parts divided at arbitrary points. Figure 1 provides examples of these
types for images containing four and five parts. After viewing an image,
participants decided whether to label it with a novel noun in count syntax
(There were some gorps) or in mass syntax (There was some gorp). In the
animation condition, participants saw animations of a star moving along a
path, either pausing at a salient, equally-spaced point (i.e., at the cusp of
the paths around several invisible petals) or at arbitrary points. Figure 2
shows a schematic view of these animation types (the flower-shaped out-
line was invisible in the actual displays). Participants again chose between
count and mass descriptors (The star did some gleebs vs. The star did some
gleebing). In both conditions, participants preferred count syntax for the
naturally divided items and mass syntax for the arbitrarily divided ones.
Figure 3 plots the results of the four main conditions in terms of the pro-
portion of times participants chose count over mass phrases, and it shows
a parallel difference in the two domains.
Figure 2: Schematic of a naturally-divided animation with 5 breaks (top) and an
unnaturally-divided animation with 5 breaks (bottom). The position of
the star in each panel represents a point where it pauses as it traverses
the flower-shaped path (the path itself was invisible to participants).
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Figure 3: Results from Wellwood et al. (2016). Overall, count syntax was chosen
more for images than animations, and for naturally-divided displays
than for unnaturally-divided displays. There were no interaction effects,
suggesting that the naturalness of divisions influenced categorization in
the same way across domains. Error bars represent the standard error
of the mean.
These results indicate that intuitively natural shapes and paths tend to sat-
isfy atomicity, thus promoting the use of count syntax to describe images
and animations. We suspect, however, that atomicity has a more central
role to play in organizing our concepts than just encouraging the use of
count syntax. First, atomicity may determine the appropriateness of verbal
expressions, not just nominal ones. As we have already suggested, atomic-
ity in the domain of eventualities supports telic descriptions (e.g., whether
the event is explicitly said to start or stop or to occur a specified number
of times) over atelic ones. We therefore predict that a dynamic activity
with natural breaks (e.g., those in the top row in Figure 2) would encour-
age people to encode the scene as involving V-ing every second or two in
preference to V-ing around a little, for a novel verb V. An activity with
arbitrary breaks, however, should produce the opposite preference. Second,
because atomicity makes counting possible, we would expect that people’s
judgments of the similarity between two groups of objects or events would
be more sensitive to the cardinality of the groups for non-arbitrary than for
arbitrary items. The experiments we report below test these predictions.
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In what follows, we describe the static and dynamic scenes as hav-
ing natural as opposed to unnatural divisions. The natural divisions cre-
ate whole “petals” (images) or “loops” (animations), and so, intuitively,
encode more than merely non-arbitrary division. Non-arbitrary division
would seem to require a weaker cut, such that each part had the same
shape, however arbitrary that shape might appear. The sense of “natural”
we intend, then, is in the sense of “carved at the joints” – the location of
the divisions is important in addition to the overall similarity of shape
(cf. Prasada et al. 2002). In ongoing research, we explicitly test whether
naturalness in this sense or mere non-arbitrariness is sufficient to garner
the kinds of results reviewed in this section and reported below.
3. Experiment 1: Verbal language preference
This experiment makes use of participants’ preferences in pairing dynamic
displays with English sentences containing the novel verb gleeb, as a probe
of whether they categorize what’s happening in a scene as an event or a
process. If our participants’ knowledge of English can be captured roughly
as we described in §2.1, then they should know that how gleeb can be
understood differs depending on the morphosyntactic frame it appears
in. Wellwood et al. (2016) observed that participants preferred to pair dy-
namic displays whose movement pattern was broken up at regular intervals
with sentences containing a pluralized novel noun gleebs (cf. Prasada et al.
2002; Barner et al. 2008), in line with this general expectation.
However, it is possible that the semantic commitments of the nominal
plural morpheme drove the effect observed by Wellwood et al. (2016),
rather than event individuation per se. It is uncontroversial that adding -s
to a noun leads to an interpretation in terms of pluralities, each minimal
part of which is constituted by some bounded entity. Confronted with
dynamic displays, it is possible that participants merely supposed that
such a condition was better fulfilled by the display with pauses at regular
intervals than at irregular intervals, irrespective of deploying the category
‘event’. Even if we wanted to say that this supposition nonetheless reveals
access to that category, it is possible that the nominal context is ‘special’ in
inviting reference to such entities, and that these data are not particularly
informative for understanding the semantics of verbs.
In light of these questions, participants in the present experiment
viewed a dynamic display, and judged whether the scene was better de-
scribed using a sentence with a novel verb and either (i) a distributive ad-
verbial or (ii) a non-distributive adverbial. The semantics of distributivity
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require Atoms, in the technical sense described above, which is theoretically
one and the same property ultimately required by the plural morpheme.
On one trial, for example, a participant might see an object (in our case, a
star) traverse an invisible petal-shaped path with five petals, which pauses
in its movement only at the center of the ‘flower’. Following this, they are
asked to choose whether they would prefer a distributively-quantified or
a non-distributively-quantified sentence to describe the scene. On another
trial, the participant might see the star traverse the same overall path,
but pause in its movement at five arbitrary points along the path, and be
asked to make the same preference judgment. In line with previous results
linking categorization and language, we expected that participants would
be able to detect the differences between these two types of displays, and
if these differences are significant, it should lead them to make different
linguistic selections at test.
Participants. We recruited 48 participants through the Northwestern
University Department of Linguistics subject pool. They received 1 lab
credit for 1 hour of participation. The present study took around 15 min-
utes of each participants’ time, and the remaining time was used for other
studies.
Method. The experiment method is represented schematically in Fig-
ure 4. Participants first see an animation with n natural or unnatural
divisions presented on the screen. Immediately following this, a screen
with the question, “How would you prefer to describe that animation?”
appeared, along with the two options listed in (18). Participants indicated
their preference by pressing “f ” or “j” on the keyboard.
a.(18) The star gleebed every second or so.
b. The star gleebed around a little.
Design. We manipulated the factor DIVISION (natural, unnatural) and
NUMBER (of divisions: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9). Our stimuli were presented blocked
by DIVISION, in counter-balanced order. On each trial, participants were
asked to judge how they would prefer to describe the animation, given the
choices in (18).
Materials. We used the same animation stimuli as Experiment 1 in
Wellwood et al. (2016), shown schematically in Figure 2. Each combina-
tion of the factors DIVISION and NUMBER delivered a total of 12 unique
animations, each of which took 3 seconds on average to complete.
Results and discussion. Our participants strongly preferred to label
the naturally-divided animations with the novel verb gleeb when it was
paired with the distributive modifier every second or so, and the opposite
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Figure 4: Trial structure for Experiment 1
preference was observed when the animations were unnaturally-divided, as
shown in Figure 5. Furthermore, there was no overall effect of the num-
ber of divisions in a display. As we discuss below, however, we did find
a small interaction effect: the preference for distributive syntax increased
somewhat along with the number of divisions for the naturally-divided an-
imations, but remained fairly flat for the unnaturally-divided animations.
For our statistical analysis, we conducted logistic mixed effects regres-
sions (LMERs) with DIVISION and NUMBER as predictors, including both
random intercepts and slopes (i.e., the maximal model m, Barr et al. 2013).
The dependent variable was the proportion of distributive choices. The 2
and p values that we report for a given effect were derived by conducting
an ANOVA between a model m that includes a given predictor ', and the
model m0 that is exactly like m except ' is not included as a predictor. If
the difference between these two models is significant, this suggests that
' plays a significant role in explaining the data.
Participants strongly preferred to pair the naturally-divided anima-
tions with the distributively-modified sentence (The star gleebed every
second or so), and the unnaturally-divided animations with the non-dis-
tributive sentence (The star gleebed around a little) (proportion distributive
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Figure 5: Experiment 1 results. Participants more strongly preferred to pair the
sentence with gleeb every second or so with the naturally-divided ani-
mations than with the unnaturally-divided animations. Error bars rep-
resent the standard error of the mean.
choices: natural .81, unnatural .17). This effect was borne out in the statis-
tical analysis as a strong main effect of DIVISIONS, 2(1) = 50:1; p < :0001.
This effect was as we predicted: the observation by Wellwood et al. (2016)
that participants strongly preferred to pair count syntax with naturally-di-
vided animations extends to a preference for distributive modification for
those displays, suggesting that the difference in conceptualization of the
two, rather than the syntax, drives these effects.
Participants’ preference for distributive modification did not generally
change as the number of divisions increased, as the difference in proportion
of those choices was relatively similar even for the maximally different num-
bers of divisions (e.g., 4-divisions: .48, 9-divisions: .52). This was revealed
in the lack of a main effect of NUMBER, 2(1) = 1; p = :31. This result
would be unexpected if the mere number of divisions highlighted the tem-
poral structure of the event, but is unsurprising if conceptualization rather
than low-level perceptual features drives the linguistic preference.
That being said, we did observe that participants’ preference for dis-
tributive syntax in the naturally-divided animations increased along with
the number of divisions, unlike for the unnaturally-divided animations (in-
crease in proportion of distributive syntax between animations with 4 and
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9 divisions: natural 7 percentage points, unnatural 2 percentage points).
This effect was revealed in an interaction between the factors DIVISION and
NUMBER, 2(1) = 4:6; p = :032. We did not necessarily predict this result;
however, it is compatible with our main claims in the following way: nat-
urally-divided animations suggest categorization in terms of events, which
(we contend) are entities that privilege counting. Conceptualizing the dis-
play in this way, the number dimension could be made more salient, and
thus lead participants to the heightened perception that such displays are
more suitable for distributive quantification.
This last result hints that we may be able to detect effects of atomicity
on people’s conception of entities, even in a task that does not directly rely
on linguistic labeling. If naturally-divided displays, like those in Figures 1
and 2, evoke atomic objects and events, then we should expect people to
treat them as discretely quantifiable items (e.g., four objects or four events)
and to compare them by means of their cardinality. This possibility goes
along with earlier findings that the underlying concepts of entities deter-
mine, in part, the dimensions along which people compare them (Barner
& Snedeker 2006; Barner et al. 2008). Naturally discrete objects, such as
pieces of furniture, promote comparison by number in tasks that ask for
explicit judgments of “Who has more furniture?”, and naturally punctual
events, such as jumps, promote comparison by number in judgments of
“Who did more jumps?”
It may also be possible to observe this highlighting of number in situ-
ations that do not require explicit quantitative comparisons, and that do
not use noun or verb phrases to denote the entities in question – that is, in
tasks that may tap more directly the mental representations of the items.
Experiment 2 uses a method of this sort that asks participants to rate the
similarity of pairs of displays. Pairs that contain naturally atomic items
should increase the importance of number in the comparison, relative to
pairs that contain non-atomic items.
4. Experiment 2: Non-linguistic similarity
This experiment makes use of participants’ judgments of the similarity
of two displays to gauge the importance of the number of elements within
them. Although there are many psychological theories of similarity, all the-
ories portray similarity as a function of the items’ properties and relations.
According to some theories (e.g., Tversky 1977), the similarity between two
items x and y depends positively on the number of properties or features
that x and y have in common (and negatively on the number of properties
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they do not share). According to other theories (e.g., Shepard 1962), sim-
ilarity depends on the relative positions of x and y in a dimensionalized
psychological space, with greater similarity if x and y are closer on the
relevant dimensions. All theories, however, assume that people’s attention
to the features or dimensions can shift perceived similarity (Nosofsky 1984;
Shepard 1964). For example, consider two objects that have very different
shape but relatively similar color, such as a blue circle and a blue-green
octagon. A person who attends more to color than to shape will judge
these objects more similar to each other than will a person who attends
more to shape than to color.
Participants in the present experiment view a pair of displays on each
trial, and they rate the similarity of these displays. The members of a pair
differ in the number of static or dynamic entities, with the difference in
number ranging from one to five. On one trial, for example, a participant
might see two displays of petal-shaped forms like those in Figure 6, one
display containing four petals and the other containing five. On another
trial, a participant might see a pair of displays with a moving entity, like
those of Experiment 1, one including four temporal pauses and the other
five. In line with the psychophysical models just mentioned, we assume
that the difference in the number of discrete forms or movements will have
a greater impact on the similarity ratings if participants’ attention is drawn
to number. If naturally-divided items make number more salient than do
unnaturally divided ones, we should find a greater impact of number on
the perceived similarity of the former than of the latter.
Thus, our Experiment 2 was a similarity judgment study designed to
test how people perceive pairs of images or animations that differ only
in their number of divisions and the ‘naturalness’ of those divisions. The
previous experimental research that we have reviewed found that people
strongly preferred to label naturally-divided images and animations using
plural count nouns (e.g., some gleebs) but preferred mass labels for un-
naturally-divided images and animations (e.g., some gleeb/gleebing). The
results of our Experiment 1 with novel verbs reflected the same distinction.
Our expectation for Experiment 2 was that the similarity judgments would
broadly pattern with the preference results. We expected that perceived
similarity of the naturally-divided items should be greater than that for the
unnaturally-divided items, due to the greater variety of shapes and paths
among the latter. More important, the number of elements in a pair of
naturally-divided animations or images should have more impact on simi-
larity than the number of elements in a pair of unnaturally divided items.
For example, number should play a bigger part in similarity judgments
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of the two naturally-divided items at the left of Figure 1 than in judg-
ments of the two unnaturally-divided items at the right. This prediction
implies that a plot of the obtained similarity ratings against the difference
in number will display a larger slope for the naturally-divided than for the
unnaturally-divided stimuli.
Figure 6: Schematic of the trial structure for Experiment 2, comparing 4- and
5-naturally divided images
Participants. We recruited 45 participants through the Northwestern Uni-
versity Department of Psychology subject pool. They received 1 lab credit
for 30 minutes of participation. Two participants were excluded: one for
failure to complete the whole experiment, and one due to a computer error.
We report the results of the remaining 43 participants.
Method. The method is represented schematically in Figure 6. Partici-
pants would first see an image or an animation with n natural or unnatural
divisions presented on the screen, followed by another image or animation
with m; n 6= m, divisions. (Figure 6 represents the case of four versus five
naturally-divided items.) Immediately following this, a screen would ap-
pear with the question, “How similar were those two images/animations?”
(depending on the block), along with a visual representation of the scale
Acta Linguistica Academica 65, 2018
Acta Linguistica Academica / p. 492 / June 21, 2018
492 Alexis Wellwood, Susan J. Hespos & Lance Rips
to remind participants of its orientation. Participants indicated their judg-
ment by button press using the number keys at the top of the keyboard.
Design. We manipulated the factors DOMAIN (animations, images) and
DIVISION (natural, unnatural). In addition, the experiment varied the dif-
ference between the number of elements in a pair. We call this difference
“CONTRAST”, and it ranged from 1 (e.g., a pair consisting of four vs. five
objects or movements) to 5 (a pair consisting of four vs. nine objects or
movements). We presented our stimuli in a design blocked by the factors
DOMAIN and DIVISION, in counter-balanced order. That is, in our design,
participants only ever judged (i) pairs of images or pairs of animations,
and (ii) pairs of naturally-or unnaturally-divided displays; they were never
asked to judge, e.g., an image paired with an animation, or a naturally-di-
vided display paired with an unnaturally-divided display. Participants were
furthermore never asked to rate the similarity of identical displays (i.e.,
there was always a difference in CONTRAST for each pair of displays). Par-
ticipants were asked to rate “how similar” the two images or animations
were on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 labeled ‘not at all similar’ and 7 labeled
‘very similar’.
Materials. We used the same image and animation stimuli as Experi-
ment 1 in Wellwood et al. (2016), shown schematically in Figures 1 and 2
above. These consisted of items with 4–9 divisions, for each combination
of the 2 levels of DOMAIN and DIVISION, for a total of 12 unique images
and 12 animations. Each image was visible for 3 seconds, the same amount
of time that each animation took on average.
Results and discussion. We found that pairs of displays with natu-
ral divisions were rated more similar overall, suggesting that participants
detected the difference between natural and unnatural divisions, as we pre-
dicted. Figure 7 shows that this difference was present for both images and
animations. Furthermore, the naturally-divided conditions showed greater
sensitivity to numerical contrast – i.e., greater differences in number were
seen as more different – as revealed by an interaction effect between DI-
VISION and CONTRAST. This can be seen as a difference in slopes of the
functions in Figure 8, which are the best-fitting straight lines to the average
ratings (points in the graph).
We conducted statistical analyses just as in Experiment 1, except we
included the factors DOMAIN, DIVISION, and CONTRAST (as a continuous
variable) as predictors, and our regressions were linear rather than logistic.
As Figure 7 suggests, participants regarded naturally-divided displays as
more similar than unnaturally-divided ones. The mean similarity rating for
the natural items on our 1–7 scale was 4.36 and the mean for the unnatural
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Figure 7: Experiment 2 results: similarity by domain and divisions. Overall, pairs
of animations were judged more similar than pairs of images, and the
naturally-divided animations and images were judged more similar than
the unnaturally-divided animations and images. Also, the difference be-
tween natural and unnatural was greater for images than for animations.
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
items 3.62, 2 = 49:6; p < :001. As we mentioned earlier, this is probably
the result of the uniformity in the shape of the naturally-divided objects
and events, compared to the variability in the shape of the unnaturally-di-
vided ones (see Figure 1). However, as Figure 7 also shows, the difference
due to naturalness was greater for the images than for the animations,
2 = 38:8; p < :001. Because an animation unfolds in time, whereas the
parts of an image appear simultaneously, participants may have found it
easier to perceive variations in similarity in the case of images.
The crucial results in this experiment, however, are those associated
with the number of items, which appear in Figure 8. Rated similarity
decreased across the board as the difference in the number of items in-
creased, 2 = 95:4; p < :001. This effect is apparent in the negative
slopes in the figure. The number effect was also about equally large for
animations and for images overall: There was no significant interaction
between these two factors, 2 < 1. Of more interest, the effect of num-
ber was greater for the naturally-divided than for the unnaturally-divided
items, 2 = 11:1; p < :001. For naturally-divided items, similarity ratings
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Figure 8: Experiment 2 results: similarity by domain, divisions, and contrast in
number. The same effects as revealed in Figure 7 are evident here, as
is the greater difference in slopes for the naturally-divided animations
and images than for the unnaturally-divided animations and images.
decreased by 2.43 scale points from pairs that differed by one element to
pairs that differed by five; but for the unnaturally-divided items, similarity
ratings decreased by 1.96 scale points across the same range. This lends
support to the idea that number is an especially salient dimension of com-
parison for stimuli that people conceive as atomic, countable units. On our
interpretation, the uniform petal-shaped objects or movements drew par-
ticipants’ attention to the number of these items as a main determinant
of similarity.
The effect of number on naturally-versus unnaturally-divided items
was somewhat greater in the case of images than animations. This ap-
pears in Figure 8 as a larger difference in slope between naturally-divided
and unnaturally-divided items for the images (at the right of figure) than
for the animations (at the left). This difference produced a marginally sig-
nificant 3-way interaction among CONTRAST (1–5), DOMAIN, (image vs.
animation), and DIVISION (natural vs. unnatural), 2 = 3:5; p = :06.
Probing this result further, we found that the effect was driven by an in-
teraction between CONTRAST and DIVISION in the image condition, 2 =
16:1; p < :001, while there was no such interaction in the animation condi-
tion, 2 = :95; p = :33. We did not predict this pattern, but it may again
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be due to the possibility, mentioned earlier, that number is more obvious in
a simultaneously presented image than in a dynamically unfolding anima-
tion. Animations may make more demands on working memory to retain
properties like path shape and number, damping the effects of differences
among them.
We see these results as confirming the idea that natural divisions make
both static and dynamic entities appear atomic and so eligible for counting.
The uniform divisions indicate that the entities are distinct, non-overlap-
ping elements to which our standard counting procedures easily apply. The
salience of the cardinality of the elements, in turn, makes cardinality apt
for comparison. Participants’ similarity judgments reflect this effect, since
these judgments track cardinality more closely for the naturally-divided
displays than for the unnaturally-divided ones. The results dovetail in this
way with those of Experiment 1 and the earlier research we cited. Those
results indicated that natural divisions prompt count syntax choices; the
present results suggest that they do so because the natural divisions render
the entities countable.
We note, however, that although our earlier results provide robust
evidence that naturally-divided events attract both count nouns (Wellwood
et al. 2016) and distributive modifiers (Experiment 1 of the present paper),
the effects of natural divisions on similarity in the present experiment is
weaker for animations than for images. We have suggested that the weaker
effect may be due to the events’ greater demands on cognitive processing,
but this raises the question of why the same difference did not appear in the
earlier studies. Although we have no definitive answer to this question, we
suspect the similarity judgments of the present study may be less sensitive
than the linguistic judgments of the earlier ones. Similarity judgments, by
their nature, are diffuse and flexible (Sloman & Rips 1998): They depend
on a particular analysis of the features or dimensions of the to-be-judged
items, as we mentioned at the beginning of this section. Variability in the
analysis from person-to-person or from time-to-time can limit the ability
of such judgments to detect effects of interest.
5. General discussion
We have been assuming that atomistic concepts carve out countable el-
ements across ontological domains. Items that people conceive as having
natural or nonabitrary shape present themselves as units that we can count
and quantify distributively, no matter whether they are spatial or tempo-
ral entities. In the present experiments, we manipulated atomicity through
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repetition of a single shape that appeared as a bounded region or path,
and we found parallel effects in the object and event domains. In Experi-
ment 1, when participants saw animations of an object pausing at natural
positions along identically shaped, though invisible paths (i.e., the cen-
ter of a “flower”), they preferred to describe the event as gleebing every
second or so in preference to gleebing around a little. This result extends
to telic (versus atelic) descriptions our earlier findings on count (versus
mass) syntax (Wellwood et al. 2016): Repetition of a natural region or
path prompts choice of count syntax for both objects and events. Exper-
iment 2 showed that the effects of atomicity extend to a task that does
not require overt linguistic judgments. Displaying single-shaped regions or
paths highlights the cardinality of these elements and makes differences
in cardinality a more important determinant of similarity. Thus, in line
with our assumption, people’s mental representation of natural divisions
in shapes and paths seems to produce an impression of atomic units and
make these units individually quantifiable.
The effect of numerical contrast that we observed in our similarity
judgment study was perhaps not as large as we might have expected, in
light of the hypothesis that the perception of individual units influences
the salience of numerical differences. However, one feature of our design
may have made this effect more difficult to observe. In both our image and
animation conditions, an increase in numerical difference (i.e., the differ-
ence between the number of breaks in one image/animation and another
image/animation) also represented an increase along other non-numerical
dimensions. In the image condition, an increase from four breaks to five
breaks was perfectly correlated with an increase in total line length and
total pixel coverage between the line drawings. In the animation condi-
tion, an increase from four to five breaks was correlated with an increase
in total path length and total duration. In light of the earlier experimental
results we reviewed above, one possibility is that participants were tuning
into the numerical dimension in our natural condition, while tuning into
increases along these other dimensions in the unnatural condition. If so,
then we might have observed an overall decrease in similarity scores as nu-
merical contrast increased, but for different reasons in the two conditions.
We are exploring this possibility in ongoing work by comparing conditions
in which the numerical dimension is correlated and anti-correlated with
continuous dimensions like length (images) and duration (animations).
A further suggestion for future work raised by these studies is the
possibility of using the properties of conceptualization – in terms of atomic
objects and events, as opposed to non-atomic substances and processes – to
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predict how people should quantify with novel nouns and verbs. Barner
and Snedeker (2006) showed that adults and children can make use of
conceptual features of static entities as well as their knowledge of the mor-
phosyntactic mass/count distinction to influence their judgments of what
counts as “more” with a novel noun like fem. In one condition, for exam-
ple, they would present adults and children with a portion of a non-solid
substance for which the participants likely did not already have a name
(e.g., green butter). It would be described using a noun phrase like a fem
(count syntax) or some fem (mass syntax). They found that adults cate-
gorically preferred to judge presentations of multiple such portions using
more fems based on number, but more fem based on volume. The three
year olds showed a similar asymmetry, but showed a stronger bias towards
volume. Our results suggest the possibility that parallel preferences could
obtain for dynamic entities, whether described using deverbal nouns (e.g.,
do more femming/do more fems; cf. Barner et al. 2008) or a novel verb
(e.g., gleeb more). Given dynamic displays with (what we have called)
unnatural divisions, we would expect count syntax to unambiguously bias
participants towards quantification by the number of breaks, but we would
expect participants to be biased towards continuous dimensions when the
comparison is expressed using mass syntax or using a novel verb (unmarked
for number).
These results also have implications for the early cognitive develop-
ment, prior to successful acquisition of the relevant grammatical distinc-
tions. Our contention is that the conceptual categories that we have tar-
geted are not derivative of linguistic knowledge, but rather present and
available independently. A wealth of evidence from developmental science
suggests that objects, substances, events, and processes are fundamental
to how we shape our experience of the world, and are evident to some de-
gree from the earliest ages it is possible to test (Ferry et al. 2015; Hespos
et al. 2009a;b; 2010). Results from preverbal infants provide the crucial
sort of evidence for any claim of conceptual priority, since in these cases it
is not obviously possible to attribute the knowledge to some abstraction
based on linguistic knowledge. Rather, language learning seems to develop
by linking linguistic forms to universal, pre-existing conceptual categories
(Hespos & Spelke 2004). We are currently exploring whether preverbal
infants reveal similar patterns to adults when tested with images and ani-
mations that vary in precisely the ways we have tested in the experiments
reported here.
This paper thus attempts to contribute to recent research suggesting a
“naturalization” of natural language semantics. This project aims to ground
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at least some of the semanticists’ formal posits in independently-under-
stood aspects of human psychology. To the extent that we have been suc-
cessful, the project hints at a view wherein the categories of entity posited
in our models – the objects, substances, events, processes, states, and other
things besides – correspond to categories of conceptualization whose prop-
erties, in many cases, have yet to be isolated in cognition. If the properties
that semanticists posit for such entities predict properties of conceptual-
ization, independently of language (potentially even before a language has
been acquired, as in the case of prelinguistic infants), the question of what
sort of meaning theory predicts such generalizations becomes more acute.
At a minimum, establishing these generalizations could suggest a view on
which semantic interpretation in Lewis’s (1970) sense – as establishing a
direct linkage between an expression and the mind-independent world – is
seriously attenuated. The world might not deliver the right sorts of entities
for that interpretation.
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